PART II of III
The battle
The geography of the battlefield is such that on the eastern side of what was the edge of the embryo village of Graham’s Town, a gentle slope leads to a small stream known as the Blaauwkrantz River. On the other side of the stream is a plain where Willshire deployed his forces. 2 km to the east of the stream the plain gives way to a ridge, the most prominent feature of which is a knoll, now known as Makana’s Kop. It was along the ridge and the Kop where the amaNdlambe forces massed before the attack. This was the only set-piece battle of the East Cape Frontier Wars before 1850 and the only occasion on which the amaNdlambe abandoned their traditional bush-fighting in favour of open warfare (Peires, 1981 p143).
Table 1 (in Part I) refers. The forces defending the village were under the overall command of Lt-Col Willshire, OC of the 38th Regiment of Foot. He was regarded as a strict, but fair, and highly capable officer known to his men as ‘Tiger Tom’.
As best can be discerned from Willshire’s account of his troop deployment, he pushed the 38th Light Company across the river to the point where he expected the thrust of the amaNdlambe attack to be. See Figure 1 (Map) and Figure 2 (Oblique photograph). The Cape Regiment (CR) was extended “along and below the point of a gentle slope from a plain about 800 yards from the town to cover two guns” (i.e. artillery pieces) taken across the river and placed on the open plain in rear of and above the mounted infantry and the 38th.
Figure 1 A conjectural map of the battle based on Lt Col Willshire’s 1846 article.
Part of the Royal African Corps (RAC) were sent across the river “to remain in support of the guns and extended troops”. Willshire states that he “therefore left five pieces of artillery at the end of town” so that “as soon as we descended [i.e. retreated] from the plain into the ravine [donga] to re-cross, those guns would have the [enemy] open to them all across the plain if they followed us”. The CR were kept “in reserve for those guns in the event of any attack being made on the town from another point.” About 2 km downstream from the position occupied by the 38th were the East Barracks, home of the CR, on the right bank of the river. This was where Fort England is now located and 60 RAC troops were sent to defend them.
Willshire estimated that the amaNdlambe force was not in excess of 6 000 warriors, although most writers of secondary sources place it much higher. Stretch (1876), for example, gives a figure of 9 000. In his report to Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Somerset inflated the figure to at least 10 000, almost certainly as leverage for obtaining more British troops for the colony from a parsimonious treasury (Somerset, 1819 p193; Scott, 1973, p118). Fraser stated that anything above 5 000 was an exaggeration.
The warriors were each armed with 8-10 throwing spears which, if well thrown, had a maximum range of a little over 60 metres in the hands of a skilled thrower according to Tylden, (1952, p136). The hafts could be broken should the need for close in-fighting arise (Barrow, 1806, p414). In addition, many of the warriors had a body-length oval ox-hide shield which a skilled operator could also use as a weapon, but which provided no protection against bullets. Both Willshire and Fraser claim that several of the warriors had muskets which, if they did, would probably have been obtained from traders or deserters. Willshire also makes a passing reference to ‘a deserter’ assisting them, which Somerset translates into “the plan was formed and directed by certain deserters of the [Royal] African Corps” (Somerset, 1819, p201). The amaNdlambe and their allies were under the overall command of either Makana or Mdushane, the eldest son of Ndlambe, which would have been the tradition. Historical records, such as they are, are ambiguous about this. Sources also vary as to who was leading which part of the battle.
The weaponry available to the British forces consisted of the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore flint-lock musket known as the ‘Brown Bess’, which had a 15 inch bayonet for hand-to-hand fighting. Its effective range was about 70m (Tylden, 1952, p136) and a well-trained soldier could fire two to three shots a minute, though not for continuous periods. Willshire is obscure about the artillery which he had available. His descriptions have been variously read as between three and seven pieces. Tylden, (1952, p136) suggests five, possibly a combination of 3-pdrs and 6-pdrs, under the command of an officer of the Royal Artillery. It is nowhere stated who actually manned the guns during the battle.
When the amaNdlambe advanced down the hill onto the plains below at 13h30, they were organised into three divisions: about 1 000 warriors had been sent to attack the East Barracks and the other two divisions launched a frontal assault on the eastern side of town itself, apparently where Willshire had expected them to. (See Figure 2 – an oblique photograph of the battlefield.)
Figure 2 An oblique aerial photograph showing the slopes down which the amaNdlambe attacked and retreated.
Willshire then directed his troops to advance and open fire on those in front to induce the mass of warriors to move down to their support and get them within the range of the two artillery pieces placed across the river. Amidst war cries they “rushed down to the troops, a short distance, in masses and then spread into clouds covering the hill as they ran.” Willshire describes this charge in terms such as “a most determined and well arranged attack” and that their determination “to do as much mischief as possible was wonderful”. The amaNdlambe came to within 30-35 yards of the troops who only then retaliated with disciplined volley fire from the muskets and possibly case-shot or canister from the artillery.
Willshire records that he saw “immense numbers” trying to outflank him on only one occasion, to the right of the 38th, and that he moved the RAC from reserve, bringing them forward into line with the 38th and the CR’s mounted infantry from where they opened “a well-directed fire and completely stopped [them] from proceeding though they would not retreat till I ordered the advance to sound, when the soldiers cheered, and strange to say, [the amaNdlambe] began retreating pursued by the troops: but they ran so excessively fast that the men were not able to keep up with them”. Not wishing to be outflanked and wary of an amaNdlambe reserve rushing to get in their rear, Willshire sounded the retreat and brought his troops back to where the guns were.
There is no indication of any close-quarter fighting taking place in the direct attack on the town, the disciplined volleys of musket fire and possibly the two cannons keeping the amaNdlambe at a distance. These warriors never got to use their spears, although there were unconfirmed reports that, after the battle, many were found with their hafts broken in anticipation of hand to hand combat. According to Fraser (1952 p139) many dead warriors were also found with their full complement of spears still clutched in their right hands. The reports nevertheless suggest that the defenders had been hard pressed.
Willshire does not give any details of the fighting at the East Barracks, but Fraser states that the fighting was fierce, some warriors even getting into the barracks square which suggests that there would have been some hand-to-hand combat. Neither Willshire nor Fraser mention a hunter named Boesak possibly intervening in the battle, as alleged by Stretch and some subsequent writers. Independent sources however suggest that a small incursion by a group of hunters, towards the end of the battle cannot be entirely ruled out (Pringle 1834).
At around 15h00 the rank and file of the amaNdlambe began to waver and lose their determination, and then to retreat, thus turning the tide of battle. Initially this was in the main attack while “the firing still continued at the barracks”. Soon after, it seems that the attackers at the East Barracks also withdrew. By 15h30, says Willshire, the amaNdlambe “were beaten in every direction and retreated.” Whether this was by command or by recognition that with mounting losses they were making no headway, or by a spontaneous sense of defeat, the records make no comment and we have no idea. There was no pursuit due to a lack of horses as there was a severe outbreak of horse sickness at the time.
There are disagreements about the circumstances of the withdrawal. Stretch, and those who copy him, claim that it was a rout. Neither Willshire nor Fraser concur with this. Quite the contrary, it appears that it was sufficiently orderly for the amaNdlambe to make off with 1 000 head of cattle, mainly those belonging to the CR soldiers, a point bemoaned by Fraser, an officer in the regiment (Fraser,1819, p140; Malherbe, 2012, p78). Moreover Willshire, presumably expecting a counter attack, only withdrew into the town at dusk where he “placed the troops and guns at the necessary points for its defence, and who remained at their arms all night”. No further attack came although the British forces were on edge for days afterwards.
Casualties
Among the defenders of Graham’s Town, casualties were minimal, probably all from the East Barracks. All accounts agree with the official figure which gives three killed (two Cape Regiment men and one from the Royal African Corps) and five wounded. Eight others, including a woman and child, five soldiers and a herdsman were killed in the vicinity of Graham’s Town on the day of the battle (Fraser, p141).
The amaNdlambe casualties of the battle are difficult to determine with any accuracy as the accounts vary widely, particularly those given for the number killed. Willshire (in Somerset, 1819) reports between 700 and 800 killed and an unknown number wounded – numbers which Somerset also settles on. Many of the wounded were carried away by their comrades, and some would have died later from their wounds (Fraser, p139). Stretch (1876, p301), without giving any sources, suggests a figure of 2 000 killed. There is in fact no indication of how many would have been killed in the fighting at the East Barracks or how many would have succumbed to the sustained musket volleys and artillery fire at the main point of battle. There is also no direct evidence of how effective the cannon were and it is possible that disciplined musket fire was more effective.
PART III to follow.
Military History of South Africa 