PART III of III
Evaluation of the battle
From the amaNdlambe point of view, attacking the British military headquarters made strategic good sense. In the bigger picture of the Fifth Frontier War, it is also quite possible that the attack was conceived as a pre-emptive strike occasioned by the build-up of colonial forces as the war had been going on at a relatively low-key level for some months. Had they been able to obliterate the British garrison at Graham’s Town, the eastern Cape would have been open to invasion as far west as George and perhaps beyond. It is at the tactical level however that the amaNdlambe endeavour failed. This was the one opportunity they and their allies had of politically and militarily dominating the area. The major question begging to be answered is: why, notwithstanding the technological disparity in weaponry, the amaNdlambe with a numerical advantage of 18;1 lost the battle weighed so heavily in their favour. The reasons for this are complex.
While superior weaponry is an important factor, it is not the only one deciding the outcome of battles: superior weaponry has not always won battles and it is a simplistic and ill-informed response to attribute the amaNdlambe lack of success in Graham’s Town to this single factor. While there may well have been cultural and social considerations, some very questionable decisions (arguably even blunders) were made by the attackers. Looked at from a dispassionate point of view, the amaNdlambe leadership made three significant errors of judgment, which in turn led to poor military decisions and, arguably, unnecessary loss of life in the field.
- Firstly, the delay of nearly two hours in attacking once the trap had been sprung thus allowing the defenders adequate time to organise and prepare themselves. Had the amaNdlambe attacked immediately they had reached the ridge to the east of the settlement, they would, as indicated by both Willshire and Fraser, have found the British relatively unprepared. This may well have been a crucial point in determining the outcome.
- Secondly, it must be asked, why were there no attempts to surround the town and subject it to a multi-pronged attack. The amaNdlambe had the numbers to do this and the British, especially given the point above, would very likely have been unable to withstand the onslaught.
- Thirdly, and related to the above, it is very difficult to understand the sense of attacking muskets and artillery head on, over open ground in broad daylight. The amaNdlambe and their allies had had military encounters with the British and the Trekboers before and would have known full well what the capabilities of their weaponry were and must have been aware of their potentially devastating effect.
This situation was compounded by the amaNdlambe’s apparent squandering of their prior military intelligence (i.e. knowledge) of their enemy. It is not unreasonable to presume that through their known spies they were aware of what capacity the garrison had to defend itself or not. There is no evidence that they applied what they had learned about this and, in not doing so, it would seem that they threw away a major tactical advantage. This is all the more difficult to understand as, in addition to the regular spies such as Nguka, some of the intelligence had been collected by Makana himself.
Perhaps in mitigation or by way of understanding, one might argue that, as Willshire suggested, it was intended as a night attack, but after being accidently discovered on the morning of the 22nd April all surprise was lost, and the attack only went forward because the idea had gained a momentum of its own. It is possible too that the need to attack was urged on by concern about the possible arrival of some reinforcements for the garrison, as a build-up of British forces was known by the amaNdlambe to be in process.
Another factor to consider is that, unlike the British professional army which they faced, the amaNdlambe were ‘citizen soldiers’, not necessarily well-trained or exercised in either on-battlefield manoeuvrings or the exercise of individual initiative when circumstances altered. The British troops by contrast were highly trained, disciplined, and able to respond to the contingencies of the battlefield when commanded to do so. While the rank and file troops were also not trained to use their individual initiative, their officers were, and could use simple but effective command systems, such as the bugle, to effect quick changes in actual battlefield tactics to meet the needs of the moment. This is illustrated by the rapid and effective halting of the amaNdlambe outflanking attempt and the quick recall of the 38th troops when they had initially charged after the retreating warriors.
The weapons themselves and the training or practise in the use of them, such as firing volleys on command rather than single shots, is also a factor. It was well understood by European armies that muskets fired in volleys had a much greater physical and psychological impact on the soldiers on the receiving end, than did single shots fired by the same number of men.
On the amaNdlambe side, since many unused spears were reportedly found after the battle (Fraser 1819 p139), it appears that at the site of the main battle they were not thrown at the British troops, even though the warriors were purportedly well within range of throwing them – 30-35 yards (27-32m) according to Willshire. There is also no record of British troops in this part of the battle having been struck by spears or having engaged in hand-to-hand combat. It would thus seem from the evidence after the battle that the amaNdlambe were possibly so set on engaging in close quarter fighting (perhaps as they had been instructed to do) that they collectively forewent the opportunity to throw their spears even when they could have been effective in thinning the British lines.
Some writers and commentators have suggested that over-confidence in the medicine of their war doctors, being hyped-up for battle as soldiers often are when expecting victory, or arrogance in assuming that because of their overwhelming numbers they would have a walk-over, played a major role. We do not really know to what extent this might have been the case, but it would certainly not be the first time in the history of warfare that these factors applied.
While each of the points listed had some significance in terms of the end result, some were clearly much more critical than others. Collectively they constituted the elements of defeat.
When all is said and done, by virtue of their numbers and fighting potential, the amaNdlambe should not have lost the battle. The evidence available suggests that the overall reason why they did not win must lie in large measure on poor and inept leadership on the part of the amaNdlambe. For this Makana, the apparent overall leader, must be held largely responsible. Far from being a ‘hero’ as he is sometimes touted, it would seem that in military terms he was a man of limited talent who found himself in circumstances way beyond his depth. He quite possibly did not, or could not, recognise the situation in which he found himself and fell victim to sequence of events which once in process was beyond his control to change. This phenomenon is not unique in military history.
While there is no suggestion in the recorded evidence that Makana was not a person of integrity and that in later surrendering he put his people above his own interests, there is nothing ‘heroic’ about losing a battle when the odds are stacked so heavily in one’s favour. There are relatively few other examples of such defeats in global military history, and according heroic status to those who led such defeats is virtually unknown in the military-historical affairs of humanity. The bravery of the amaNdlambe warriors was never questioned or in doubt, but it might be noted that mystics and prophets have seldom made good generals or captains, and their followers have frequently paid in blood, often heavily. The Battle of Graham’s Town in 1819 was no exception. It might be better to remember Makana for his positive traits and his interest in theological matters rather than as an artificially created hero to serve current political ends.
On the British side, the descriptions of the defence available to us suggest that it was steady but not heroic, despite some contentions to the contrary. It was however conducted by a man of known military competence. Willshire nevertheless described the result of the battle as ‘close’ and was quoted by Stretch as saying at a dinner a few nights after the battle that at one period in the fight, presumably during the single attempted outflanking movement, “he would not have given a feather for the safety of the town….” (Stretch, 1876, p301)
Conclusion
Regarding the outcome of the battle, the South African military historian, Major Geoffrey Tylden (1952, p135) has posited that it was the first occasion in South Africa in which a handful of individuals repulsed superior numbers relying on the arme blanche, with insignificant loss to the defending side. He argues too that it not only influenced future eastern Cape Frontier tactics (including on the part of the amaXhosa, a reversion to ‘bush fighting’ at which they were much more adept), but set the pattern for many, though not all, of the military encounters of the Great Trek. There were of course other instances when this was not true, such as the Battle of the Vaal (1836) Blaauwkrantz (1838), Isandlwana (1879) and even Holkrantz in 1902.
To get a wider perspective on the scale of this event, we might note that it ranks low in the annals of British military history, receiving only seven lines in Fortescue’s definitive 13-volume History of the British Army (Fortescue, 1923, p394). Some British and South African historians have dismissed it as no more than a major skirmish.
In the South African context however, the result had long-term consequences, not only for Britain’s recently acquired Cape Colony and the future of its eastern border region, but for the general westward migration of the isiXhosa-speaking clans. Had Makana and the amaNdlambe won the day, which, again it must be emphasized, they should have, it is possible that other clans may have joined them in a great sweep well beyond the village and fort at Algoa Bay as had occurred in the Third Frontier War (1799-1802). The semi-itinerant Trekboers in the area may finally have abandoned the volatile frontier zone and the Great Trek might have taken place earlier than it did, with unknown consequences. In such an event the British authorities in the Cape Colony may have decided to reconquer the territory, but might equally have decided to abandon it as an unnecessary expense with little or no return. Willshire (1846, p2) himself mentions the likely loss of the frontier under such circumstances. In either event there would have been no British settlers arriving in the Eastern Cape in 1820, and the social and political history of the area would have been entirely different. Within the context of South African history, there can be little question that the Battle of Graham’s Town was a decisive one.
References used
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Military History of South Africa 