Battle of Graham’s Town continued…

 

PART  III of III

Evaluation of the battle

From the amaNdlambe point of view, attacking the British military headquarters made strategic good sense. In the bigger picture of the Fifth Frontier War, it is also quite possible that the attack was conceived as a pre-emptive strike occasioned by the build-up of colonial forces as the war had been going on at a relatively low-key level for some months. Had they been able to obliterate the British garrison at Graham’s Town, the eastern Cape would have been open to invasion as far west as George and perhaps beyond.  It is at the tactical level however that the amaNdlambe endeavour failed. This was the one opportunity they and their allies had of politically and militarily dominating the area. The major question begging to be answered is: why, notwithstanding the technological disparity in weaponry, the amaNdlambe with a numerical advantage of 18;1 lost the battle weighed so heavily in their favour. The reasons for this are complex.

While superior weaponry is an important factor, it is not the only one deciding the outcome of battles: superior weaponry has not always won battles and it is a simplistic and ill-informed response to attribute the amaNdlambe lack of success in Graham’s Town to this single factor.  While there may well have been cultural and social considerations, some very questionable decisions (arguably even blunders) were made by the attackers.  Looked at from a dispassionate point of view, the amaNdlambe leadership made three significant errors of judgment, which in turn led to poor military decisions and, arguably, unnecessary loss of life in the field.

• Firstly, the delay of nearly two hours in attacking once the trap had been sprung thus allowing the defenders adequate time to organise and prepare themselves. Had the amaNdlambe attacked immediately they had reached the ridge to the east of the settlement, they would, as indicated by both Willshire and Fraser, have found the British relatively unprepared. This may well have been a crucial point in determining the outcome.
• Secondly, it must be asked, why were there no attempts to surround the town and subject it to a multi-pronged attack. The amaNdlambe had the numbers to do this and the British, especially given the point above, would very likely have been unable to withstand the onslaught.
• Thirdly, and related to the above, it is very difficult to understand the sense of attacking muskets and artillery head on, over open ground in broad daylight. The amaNdlambe and their allies had had military encounters with the British and the Trekboers before and would have known full well what the capabilities of their weaponry were and must have been aware of their potentially devastating effect.

This situation was compounded by the amaNdlambe’s apparent squandering of their prior military intelligence (i.e. knowledge) of their enemy. It is not unreasonable to presume that through their known spies they were aware of what capacity the garrison had to defend itself or not. There is no evidence that they applied what they had learned about this and, in not doing so, it would seem that they threw away a major tactical advantage. This is all the more difficult to understand as, in addition to the regular spies such as Nguka, some of the intelligence had been collected by Makana himself.

Perhaps in mitigation or by way of understanding, one might argue that, as Willshire suggested, it was intended as a night attack, but after being accidently discovered on the morning of the 22^nd April all surprise was lost, and the attack only went forward because the idea had gained a momentum of its own. It is possible too that the need to attack was urged on by concern about the possible arrival of some reinforcements for the garrison, as a build-up of British forces was known by the amaNdlambe to be in process.

Another factor to consider is that, unlike the British professional army which they faced, the amaNdlambe were ‘citizen soldiers’, not necessarily well-trained or exercised in either on-battlefield manoeuvrings or the exercise of individual initiative when circumstances altered. The British troops by contrast were highly trained, disciplined, and able to respond to the contingencies of the battlefield when commanded to do so. While the rank and file troops were also not trained to use their individual initiative, their officers were, and could use simple but effective command systems, such as the bugle, to effect quick changes in actual battlefield tactics to meet the needs of the moment. This is illustrated by the rapid and effective halting of the amaNdlambe outflanking attempt and the quick recall of the 38^th troops when they had initially charged after the retreating warriors.

The weapons themselves and the training or practise in the use of them, such as firing volleys on command rather than single shots, is also a factor. It was well understood by European armies that muskets fired in volleys had a much greater physical and psychological impact on the soldiers on the receiving end, than did single shots fired by the same number of men.

On the amaNdlambe side, since many unused spears were reportedly found after the battle (Fraser 1819 p139), it appears that at the site of the main battle they were not thrown at the British troops, even though the warriors were purportedly well within range of throwing them – 30-35 yards (27-32m) according to Willshire. There is also no record of British troops in this part of the battle having been struck by spears or having engaged in hand-to-hand combat. It would thus seem from the evidence after the battle that the amaNdlambe were possibly so set on engaging in close quarter fighting (perhaps as they had been instructed to do) that they collectively forewent the opportunity to throw their spears even when they could have been effective in thinning the British lines.

Some writers and commentators have suggested that over-confidence in the medicine of their war doctors, being hyped-up for battle as soldiers often are when expecting victory, or arrogance in assuming that because of their overwhelming numbers they would have a walk-over,  played a major role. We do not really know to what extent this might have been the case, but it would certainly not be the first time in the history of warfare that these factors applied.

While each of the points listed had some significance in terms of the end result, some were clearly much more critical than others. Collectively they constituted the elements of defeat.

When all is said and done, by virtue of their numbers and fighting potential, the amaNdlambe should not have lost the battle. The evidence available suggests that the overall reason why they did not win must lie in large measure on poor and inept leadership on the part of the amaNdlambe. For this Makana, the apparent overall leader, must be held largely responsible. Far from being a ‘hero’ as he is sometimes touted, it would seem that in military terms he was a man of limited talent who found himself in circumstances way beyond his depth. He quite possibly did not, or could not, recognise the situation in which he found himself and fell victim to sequence of events which once in process was beyond his control to change. This phenomenon is not unique in military history.

While there is no suggestion in the recorded evidence that Makana was not a person of integrity and that in later surrendering he put his people above his own interests, there is nothing ‘heroic’ about losing a battle when the odds are stacked so heavily in one’s favour.  There are relatively few other examples of such defeats in global military history, and according heroic status to those who led such defeats is virtually unknown in the military-historical affairs of humanity. The bravery of the amaNdlambe warriors was never questioned or in doubt, but it might be noted that mystics and prophets have seldom made good generals or captains, and their followers have frequently paid in blood, often heavily. The Battle of Graham’s Town in 1819 was no exception.  It might be better to remember Makana for his positive traits and his interest in theological matters rather than as an artificially created hero to serve current political ends.

On the British side, the descriptions of the defence available to us suggest that it was steady but not heroic, despite some contentions to the contrary. It was however conducted by a man of known military competence. Willshire nevertheless described the result of the battle as ‘close’ and was quoted by Stretch as saying at a dinner a few nights after the battle that at one period in the fight, presumably during the single attempted outflanking movement, “he would not have given a feather for the safety of the town….” (Stretch, 1876, p301)

Conclusion

Regarding the outcome of the battle, the South African military historian, Major Geoffrey Tylden (1952, p135) has posited that it was the first occasion in South Africa in which a handful of individuals repulsed superior numbers relying on the arme blanche, with insignificant loss to the defending side. He argues too that it not only influenced future eastern Cape Frontier tactics (including on the part of the amaXhosa, a reversion to ‘bush fighting’ at which they were much more adept), but set the pattern for many, though not all, of the military encounters of the Great Trek. There were of course other instances when this was not true, such as the Battle of the Vaal (1836) Blaauwkrantz (1838), Isandlwana (1879) and even Holkrantz in 1902.

To get a wider perspective on the scale of this event, we might note that it ranks low in the annals of British military history, receiving only seven lines in Fortescue’s definitive 13-volume History of the British Army (Fortescue, 1923, p394). Some British and South African historians have dismissed it as no more than a major skirmish.

 In the South African context however, the result had long-term consequences, not only for Britain’s recently acquired Cape Colony and the future of its eastern border region, but for the general westward migration of the isiXhosa-speaking clans. Had Makana and the amaNdlambe won the day, which, again it must be emphasized, they should have, it is possible that other clans may have joined them in a great sweep well beyond the village and fort at Algoa Bay as had occurred in the Third Frontier War (1799-1802). The semi-itinerant Trekboers in the area may finally have abandoned the volatile frontier zone and the Great Trek might have taken place earlier than it did, with unknown consequences. In such an event the British authorities in the Cape Colony may have decided to reconquer the territory, but might equally have decided to abandon it as an unnecessary expense with little or no return. Willshire (1846, p2) himself mentions the likely loss of the frontier under such circumstances. In either event there would have been no British settlers arriving in the Eastern Cape in 1820, and the social and political history of the area would have been entirely different.  Within the context of South African history, there can be little question that the Battle of Graham’s Town was a decisive one.

 References used

 Barrow John   1806   Travels into the interior of southern Africa Vol 1   London   Cadell & Davies

Cory GE   1910   The Rise of South Africa: A history of the origin of South African colonisation and of its development towards the East from the earliest times to 1857  London    Longmans, Green & Co  pp369-403

De Villiers J   1989   Die Cape Regiment 1806 – 1817, ’n koloniale regiment in Britse diens   Pretoria Archives Year Book 1989/I   pp1-227

Fortescue John W (Sir)   1923   History of the British Army   Vol XI   1815-1838   p394

Fraser GS (Maj.)   1819   ‘Private letter from Major GS Fraser to Col. John Graham, 23^rd April 1819’  in  CT

Atkinson (Ed)  1942   Supplementary Report on the manuscripts of Robert Graham Esq of Fintry   pp138-141 [In this letter Major Fraser describes the battle based on information he obtained from participants the day after the event.]

Graham John (Col.)   1819    ‘Private letter from John Graham to [—-] 16^th February 1820’ in  CT Atkinson  (Ed)  1942   Supplementary Report on the manuscripts of Robert Graham Esq. of Fintry   pp143-145   [This is Graham’s account of the Battle of  Graham’s Town, information about which he seems to have received from a number of sources, It was written to a fellow officer.  Graham was not present at the battle but Commandant of Simon’s Town at the time.]

Herbst Francina & Kopke Des   2006   ‘The site of the battle of Amalinde’   Military History Journal 13 (5) 174-176

le Cordeur BA (Ed)   1988   The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch   Cape Town   Maskew Miller Longman (The Grahamstown Series)    [This Journal, which covers the  period    1797- 1849, contains a shorter account of the battle than Stretch’s 1876 article. It is suggested by the editor that the section on the battle was only inserted in the Journal in 1878, six years before he died at age 85.]

Malherbe V C   2002   ‘The Khoekhoe soldier at the Cape of Good Hope: Life and times in the Cape Regiment, c 1806 to 1870’   Military History Journal 12 (4) 148-154

Malherbe VC   2012   The Cape Regiment in peace and war 1781-1817   Cape Town   Castle Military Museum  

Milton John 1983   The edges of war: A history of Frontier Wars 1702-1878   Cape Town   Juta

Peires J B   1981   The House of Phalo   Johannesburg   Raven Press

Pringle Thomas   1834   African Sketches   Part II: Narrative of a residence in South Africa   London   Edward Moxon

Tylden Geofrey (Maj.)   1952   ‘Major-General Sir Thomas Willshire, G.C.B., and the attack on Grahamstown on the 22^nd April, 1819’   Africana Notes and News 9 (4) 135-138   September

Tylden Geofrey (Maj.)   1954   The armed forces of South Africa   Johannesburg   Africana   Museum   Frank Connock Publication No 2   Johannesburg

Scott John B   1973   The British Soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier   Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Port Elizabeth.

Somerset Charles (Lord)   1819   ‘Dispatch from Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst, Cape of Good Hope, 22^nd May 1819’ in G McC Theal (Ed) 1902   Records of the Cape Colony: May 1818- January 1820 Vol XII pp193-205

Stockenström Andries (Sir)   1887   The autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenström  2 volumes   Cape Town    Juta & Co

Stretch C L   1876   ‘Makana, and the Attack on Grahamstown, in 1819’   Cape  Monthly         Magazine, Vol 12 pp297-303

Swinson Arthur (Ed)   1972   A Register of the Regiments and Corps of the British Army: the ancestry of the regiments and corps of the regular establishment   London    The Archive Press

Willshire T (Lt Col.)   1846   ‘Attack on Grahamstown in 1819’   Graham’s Town Journal  XV (277) p2  Saturday 26^th September 1846

Battle of Graham’s Town continued…

PART  II of III

The battle

The geography of the battlefield is such that on the eastern side of what was the edge of the embryo village of Graham’s Town, a gentle slope leads to a small stream known as the Blaauwkrantz River. On the other side of the stream is a plain where Willshire deployed his forces.  2 km to the east of the stream the plain gives way to a ridge, the most prominent feature of which is a knoll, now known as Makana’s Kop. It was along the ridge and the Kop where the amaNdlambe forces massed before the attack. This was the only set-piece battle of the East Cape Frontier Wars before 1850 and the only occasion on which the amaNdlambe abandoned their traditional bush-fighting in favour of open warfare (Peires, 1981 p143).

Table 1 (in Part I) refers. The forces defending the village were under the overall command of Lt-Col Willshire, OC of the 38^th Regiment of Foot. He was regarded as a strict, but fair, and highly capable officer known to his men as ‘Tiger Tom’.

As best can be discerned from Willshire’s account of his troop deployment, he pushed the 38^th Light Company across the river to the point where he expected the thrust of the amaNdlambe attack to be. See Figure 1 (Map) and Figure 2 (Oblique photograph). The Cape Regiment (CR) was extended “along and below the point of a gentle slope from a plain about 800 yards from the town to cover two guns” (i.e. artillery pieces) taken across the river and placed on the open plain in rear of and above the mounted infantry and the 38^th.

Figure 1 A conjectural map of the battle based on Lt Col Willshire’s 1846 article.

Part of the Royal African Corps (RAC) were sent across the river “to remain in support of the guns and extended troops”. Willshire  states that he “therefore left five pieces of artillery at the end of town” so that “as soon as we descended  [i.e. retreated] from the plain into the ravine [donga] to re-cross, those guns would have the [enemy] open to them all across the plain if they followed us”.  The CR were kept “in reserve for those guns in the event of any attack being made on the town from another point.” About 2 km downstream from the position occupied by the 38^th were the East Barracks, home of the CR, on the right bank of the river. This was where Fort England is now located and 60 RAC troops were sent to defend them.

Willshire estimated that the amaNdlambe force was not in excess of 6 000 warriors, although most writers of secondary sources place it much higher. Stretch (1876), for example, gives a figure of 9 000. In his report to Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Somerset inflated the figure to at least 10 000, almost certainly as leverage for obtaining more British troops for the colony from a parsimonious treasury (Somerset, 1819 p193; Scott, 1973, p118). Fraser stated that anything above 5 000 was an exaggeration.

The warriors were each armed with 8-10 throwing spears which, if well thrown, had a maximum range of a little over 60 metres in the hands of a skilled thrower according to Tylden, (1952, p136). The hafts could be broken should the need for close in-fighting arise (Barrow, 1806, p414). In addition, many of the warriors had a body-length oval ox-hide shield which a skilled operator could also use as a weapon, but which provided no protection against bullets.  Both Willshire and Fraser claim that several of the warriors had muskets which, if they did, would probably have been obtained from traders or deserters. Willshire also makes a passing reference to ‘a deserter’ assisting them, which Somerset translates into “the plan was formed and directed by certain deserters of the [Royal] African Corps” (Somerset, 1819, p201). The amaNdlambe and their allies were under the overall command of either Makana or Mdushane, the eldest son of Ndlambe, which would have been the tradition. Historical records, such as they are, are ambiguous about this. Sources also vary as to who was leading which part of the battle.

The weaponry available to the British forces consisted of the muzzle-loading, smooth-bore flint-lock musket known as the ‘Brown Bess’, which had a 15 inch bayonet for hand-to-hand fighting.  Its effective range was about 70m (Tylden, 1952, p136) and a well-trained soldier could fire two to three shots a minute, though not for continuous periods. Willshire is obscure about the artillery which he had available. His descriptions have been variously read as between three and seven pieces. Tylden, (1952, p136) suggests five, possibly a combination of 3-pdrs and 6-pdrs, under the command of an officer of the Royal Artillery.  It is nowhere stated who actually manned the guns during the battle.

When the amaNdlambe advanced down the hill onto the plains below at 13h30, they were organised into three divisions: about 1 000 warriors had been sent to attack the East Barracks and the other two divisions launched a frontal assault on the eastern side of town itself, apparently where Willshire had expected them to.  (See Figure 2 – an oblique photograph of the battlefield.)

Figure 2 An oblique aerial photograph showing the slopes down which the amaNdlambe attacked and retreated.

Willshire then directed his troops to advance and open fire on those in front to induce the mass of warriors to move down to their support and get them within the range of the two artillery pieces placed across the river. Amidst war cries they “rushed down to the troops, a short distance, in masses and then spread into clouds covering the hill as they ran.”  Willshire describes this charge in terms such as “a most determined and well arranged attack” and that their determination “to do as much mischief as possible was wonderful”. The amaNdlambe came to within 30-35 yards of the troops who only then retaliated with disciplined volley fire from the muskets and possibly case-shot or canister from the artillery.

Willshire records that he saw “immense numbers” trying to outflank him on only one occasion, to the right of the 38^th, and that he moved the RAC from reserve, bringing them forward into line with the 38^th and the CR’s mounted infantry from where they opened “a well-directed fire and completely stopped [them] from proceeding though they would not retreat till I ordered the advance to sound, when the soldiers cheered, and strange to say, [the amaNdlambe] began retreating pursued by the troops: but they ran so excessively fast that the men were not able to keep up with them”. Not wishing to be outflanked and wary of an amaNdlambe reserve rushing to get in their rear, Willshire sounded the retreat and brought his troops back to where the guns were.

There is no indication of any close-quarter fighting taking place in the direct attack on the town, the disciplined volleys of musket fire and possibly the two cannons keeping the amaNdlambe at a distance. These warriors never got to use their spears, although there were unconfirmed reports that, after the battle, many were found with their hafts broken in anticipation of hand to hand combat. According to Fraser (1952 p139) many dead warriors were also found with their full complement of spears still clutched in their right hands. The reports nevertheless suggest that the defenders had been hard pressed.

Willshire does not give any details of the fighting at the East Barracks, but Fraser states that the fighting was fierce, some warriors even getting into the barracks square which suggests that there would have been some hand-to-hand combat. Neither Willshire nor Fraser mention a hunter named Boesak possibly intervening in the battle, as alleged by Stretch and some subsequent writers. Independent sources however suggest that a small incursion by a group of hunters, towards the end of the battle cannot be entirely ruled out (Pringle 1834).

At around 15h00 the rank and file of the amaNdlambe began to waver and lose their determination, and then to retreat, thus turning the tide of battle. Initially this was in the main attack while “the firing still continued at the barracks”.  Soon after, it seems that the attackers at the East Barracks also withdrew. By 15h30, says Willshire, the amaNdlambe “were beaten in every direction and retreated.” Whether this was by command or by recognition that with mounting losses they were making no headway, or by a spontaneous sense of defeat, the records make no comment and we have no idea. There was no pursuit due to a lack of horses as there was a severe outbreak of horse sickness at the time.

There are disagreements about the circumstances of the withdrawal. Stretch, and those who copy him, claim that it was a rout.  Neither Willshire nor Fraser concur with this. Quite the contrary, it appears that it was sufficiently orderly for the amaNdlambe to make off with 1 000 head of cattle, mainly those belonging to the CR soldiers, a point bemoaned by Fraser, an officer in the regiment (Fraser,1819, p140; Malherbe, 2012, p78). Moreover Willshire, presumably expecting a counter attack, only withdrew into the town at dusk where he “placed the troops and guns at the necessary points for its defence, and who remained at their arms all night”. No further attack came although the British forces were on edge for days afterwards.

 Casualties

Among the defenders of Graham’s Town, casualties were minimal, probably all from the East Barracks. All accounts agree with the official figure which gives three killed (two Cape Regiment men and one from the Royal African Corps) and five wounded. Eight others, including a woman and child, five soldiers and a herdsman were killed in the vicinity of Graham’s Town on the day of the battle (Fraser, p141).

 The amaNdlambe casualties of the battle are difficult to determine with any accuracy as the accounts vary widely, particularly those given for the number killed. Willshire (in Somerset, 1819) reports between 700 and 800 killed and an unknown number wounded – numbers which Somerset also settles on.  Many of the wounded were carried away by their comrades, and some would have died later from their wounds (Fraser, p139). Stretch (1876, p301), without giving any sources, suggests a figure of 2 000 killed. There is in fact no indication of how many would have been killed in the fighting at the East Barracks or how many would have succumbed to the sustained musket volleys and artillery fire at the main point of battle.  There is also no direct evidence of how effective the cannon were and it is possible that disciplined musket fire was more effective.

PART III to follow.

 

 

4. The Battle of Graham’s Town, 22nd April 1819 (Part I)

The Battle of Graham’s Town was one of the most decisive battles in South African history with both short- and long-term consequences flowing from it. Grahamstown, as the modern city is called, is located at 33°18’15.19″S and 26°31’57.94″E in the Eastern Cape Province. See also the first entry in this blog titled ‘An overview of the East Cape Frontier Wars’

The substance of this entry was originally published in the Military History Journal 18 (3) 12-17 (December 2018) and is reproduced here with permission and with some editing.  The entry on the battle is in three parts: Part I outlines briefly, the major literary sources on the battle, the circumstances leading up to it and the immediate prelude to the commencement of the battle. Part II describes the battle itself. It includes a map of the positions and movements of the two armies, and a summary of the casualties. Part III evaluates the battle, the performance of the role players and the consequences flowing from the event.  All references in the text are given at the end of Part III.

PART  I of III

Introduction

The 22^nd April 2019 was the 200^th anniversary of the Battle of Graham’s Town, then a small hamlet of probably no more than 30 simple buildings. In the major encounter of the Fifth Frontier War (1818-1819) a small British force defended themselves against an army of the amaNdlambe clan and some minor allies, 18 times its size.  This was arguably one of the most decisive battles in South African history, along with Blaauwberg and Blood River/Ncome, as it altered the course of events and political geography during the 19^th century.

Two major factors impinge on any description and understanding of this battle: the paucity of reliable source material, particularly primary sources; and the considerable amount of writing (over 40 publications) which constitutes the secondary sources available. Much of the latter is contradictory, over-imaginative, or very close to fiction. This account of the battle has accordingly drawn only on primary or substantiated secondary sources.  Strictly speaking there are only two primary sources on the battle itself, both written by the British commanding officer Lt.Col . Thomas Willshire viz. his 1819 despatch to the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, and his 1846 article in the Graham’s Town Journal, which are virtually identical.

The much-used and often-quoted 1876 article by Charles Lennox Stretch is neither a primary source nor reliable. He relied on the hearsay of others, some of which was false information. He was neither present at the battle nor ever personally claimed he was, although he was in Graham’s Town a few days later.  Thus, despite Willshire’s laconic style and paucity of detail, this article places greatest value on his account. It is backed up by a letter, a hybrid yet authentic source, written by Major George Fraser to Colonel John Graham the day after the battle. All quotations are from Willshire’s 1846 article, page 2, unless stated otherwise.

Circumstances leading to the battle

The detailed reasons for the amaNdlambe attack on the British military headquarters at Graham’s Town are beyond the scope of this article, but they boil down to long-simmering tensions on the eastern Cape frontier (Cory, 1910; Scott, 1973; Milton 1983; Peires, 2001). These involved extensive cattle theft, raids and counter raids across the border, at that time the Great Fish River, as well as internecine struggles within the amaXhosa polity. This animosity was primarily between Ngqika, the young senior chief of the amaRharabe (a major branch of the amaXhosa people) and his aged uncle, Ndlambe, who had acted as regent until Ngqika became of age. The antagonism between them was both political and personal, involving power and jealousy. While the majority of the clan appears to have supported Ndlambe, the governor, Lord Charles Somerset, had, short-sightedly in retrospect, allied the British with Ngqika.

After a major battle at Amalinde in October 1818, when Ngqika’s forces had suffered a major military defeat at the hands of Ndlambe (Herbst & Kopke, 2006), Ngqika appealed to his British allies for help. This was forthcoming in the form of a major British-amaNgqika raid into amaNdlambe territory in early December 1818, which left many of the amaXhosa east of the Fish River impoverished. The amaNdlambe were quick to retaliate and invaded the colony in late December 1818. This precipitated the Fifth Frontier War, resulting in widespread destruction of property and loss of life. The British and colonial authorities then began to build up forces for a major punitive expedition, a point not lost on the amaNdlambe.

Implicated in all this was a politically astute mystic, Nxele, also known as Makana.   Although a commoner, he had a wide following and was an influential councillor to Ndlambe. He was also well known to both missionaries and the military, among whom his agile mind and debating skills were recognised. The details of his involvement and the role he played in planning the attack on Graham’s Town are not clear although, as a war doctor and mystic, it would probably have been significant. Most writers, and certainly the British, believed he was the mastermind behind the attack and had orchestrated both it and the  general invasion which preceded it.

Prelude to the battle

The attack on Graham’s Town began to take form at mid-morning on 22^nd April 1819. The amaNdlambe had in the preceding days managed to assemble an army of several thousands of warriors within 10km of the settlement without the British being aware of it. At about 10h30 Lt.Col. Willshire, newly arrived on the frontier, was inspecting the Cape Regiment (CR) troop of mounted infantry when he received a report of cattle being taken nearby.

Accompanied by 25 members of the troop, he went to investigate, pursuing the perpetrators some distance before coming across a body of 200-300 warriors who then retreated. Following them, he realised that they were attempting to lead him into a trap and surround him. Willshire attempted to retreat, but was surprised to come upon the entire amaNdlambe army which he estimated at 6 000. He concluded that they intended to attack Graham’s Town, and after sending a message to his second-in-command, Capt. Trappes, warning him of an impending attack, he and his party tried unsuccessfully to delay the advancing force as they made their escape.

As Willshire reached the town at about 11h45, the amaNdlambe army appeared on the hills and ridges to the east of it, about 2 km distant. Although they may have had the opportunity of immediately surprising and overwhelming the town, the attack was delayed for nearly two hours while, according to tradition, various rituals were conducted and final arrangements made. This delay allowed the defenders time to deploy their forces and prepare for the attack.

The village was defended by 333 armed men, the composition of which is shown in Table 1.

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Table 1   Forces defending Grahamstown: 22^nd April 1819

Royal African Corps  *                                   135                 

 Cape Regiment **                                         121                   

 38^th Regt of Foot – Light Company †         45                    

 Armed men unattached §                           32          

TOTAL                                                              333‡   
(after Somerset, 1819: Official report)

*   The Royal African Corps was a ‘Condemned’ or ‘Penal’ regiment composed of generally hardened criminals under a severe disciplinary regime. It reportedly fought with distinction in the battle.  Its commanding officer in Graham’s Town was Lieutenant Cartwright.
** The Cape Regiment, was a Khoi unit of light infantry incorporated into the British Army after 1806 because of their skill as soldiers. They were renowned as good shots and 39 of the 121 were mounted infantry. The unit was often incorrectly referred to as the ‘Cape Corps’, the ‘Cape Light Infantry’ and the ‘Cape Cavalry’.  Their barracks in Graham’s Town, where many also had their families were known as the East Barracks or Witrugkamp. It was one of the two major centres of fighting during the battle. Its commanding officer was Major Fraser.
†   The 38^th Regiment of Foot were regular infantry of the line with a good reputation. Col. Willshire was their Commanding officer.

§   These are variously described as civilians and artificers. Presumably there were gunners among them.

‡    In addition there were also an unknown number of women and children in the village (Malherbe, 2012, p83).

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PART II to follow.